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A B S T R A C T
Never before have we had access to as much information as we do today, but how do we avail ourselves of it? In
parallel with the increase in the amount of information, we have created means of curating and delivering it in
sophisticated ways, through the technologies of algorithms, Big Data and artiﬁcial intelligence. I examine how
information is curated, and how digital technology has led to the creation of ﬁlter bubbles, while simultaneously
creating closed online spaces in which people of similar opinions can congregate – echo chambers. These phe-
nomena partly stem from our tendency towards selective exposure – a tendency to seek information that supports
pre-existing beliefs, and to avoid unpleasant information. This becomes a problem when the information and the
suggestions we receive, and the way we are portrayed creates expectations, and thus becomes leading. When the
technologies I discuss are employed as they are today, combined with human nature, they pose a threat to liberty
by undermining individuality, autonomy and the very foundation of liberal society. Liberty is an important part
of our image of the good society, and this article is an attempt to analyse one way in which applications of
technology can be detrimental to our society. While Alexis De Tocqueville feared the tyranny of the majority, we
would do well to fear the tyranny of the algorithms and perceived opinion.
1. Introduction
Never before have we had access to as much information as we do
today, but how do we avail ourselves of it? In parallel with the increase
in the amount of information, we have created means of curating and
delivering it in sophisticated ways, through the technologies of algo-
rithms, Big Data and artiﬁcial intelligence. In this article, I examine
how liberty is threatened by the way in which information is now
handled.
I start by examining some aspects of human psychology, such as the
phenomenon called selective exposure, which denotes a human ten-
dency to seek out information that supports pre-existing beliefs, and to
avoid unpleasant information that contradicts our opinions. I then
discuss how information is curated in today's society, and how digital
technology has led to the creation of ﬁlter bubbles, while simultaneously
creating closed online spaces in which people of similar opinions can
congregate. While some liberals argue that more information can lead
to exposure to new ideas and something akin to general enlightenment,
I argue that we might be seeing the opposite happening in today's so-
ciety. If people today, despite all the information that is available, are
less exposed to ideas they consider undesirable, uncomfortable and
provocative, Big Data and algorithms might lead to less liberal societies,
with individuals living in conditions that do not allow for the full
development of individuality.
More speciﬁcally, I consider how certain eﬀects created by Big Data,
and the algorithms used to (a) deliver information to us, and (b) deliver
information from us to others, might make the problem discussed above
even worse. When the information and the suggestions we receive, and
the way we are portrayed creates expectations, they become leading, and
thus of interest in relation to liberty. I focus on how all these issues
operate in concert, and thus become more threatening than each phe-
nomenon seen in isolation. In addition, I argue that the theories of
expectation I employ are useful additions to the current debate on how
our use of Big Data and algorithms is non-neutral, manipulative and
shaping. In addition, I argue that traditional political philosophy pro-
vides a good framework for understanding what we really mean when
we say that liberty is threatened.
The issues discussed may not be very problematic if we regard lib-
erty as only consisting in freedom from intentional physical inter-
ference. I, however, consider liberty to be a broader concept, and in this
article I focus on liberty of opinion and the idea that liberty is as much a
social as a political phenomenon. With this understanding of liberty, the
technological developments described above can be seen as posing a
threat to individuality, autonomy and the very foundation of liberal
society. I focus in particular on the issues of perceived opinions and
expectations and the renewed relevance of a Tocquevillian tyranny of
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opinion. This article is an answer to the call by Griﬀy-Brown, Earp &
Rosas [1] to analyse the Good Society, in which liberty is a core value
and is aﬀected by technology. While many disciplines are, or can be,
used to analyse these issues, I agree with Coeckelbergh's [2] view that it
is important to draw on political philosophy if we are to understand the
nature of liberty, and how it is impacted by technology.
I mainly limit my discussion to the eﬀects these developments have
on individuals, but these issues are also of great importance to society in
general, as there are clear connections to issues such as increasing po-
larisation, the changing nature of capitalism and the health of liberal
democracy [3]. Bozdag & van den Hoven [4] provide an important
account of how the phenomena I discuss relate to these broader societal
issues, and to theories of democracy in particular. See also Sunstein [5]
for an analysis of the implications for deliberative democracy.
While Alexis De Tocqueville feared the tyranny of the majority, we
would do well to fear the tyranny of the algorithms. In the modern age,
we traverse a digital landscape that largely consists of opinions similar
to our own, and in this sense the tyranny of opinion feared by Mill and
Tocqueville may be more oppressive now than ever before.
2. Big Data and information
2.1. Background and terminology
Our era is often referred to as the Era of Big Data [6–8]. I referred to
the amount of information available today, and this is the ﬁrst V in
Laney's deﬁnition of Big Data: volume [9]. The other two Vs stand for
velocity and variety, referring to the speed at which we now generate
and gather data, and the ‘structural heterogeneity’ of the data [10]; p.
137). In addition to the three Vs, we can note that Big Data is organic in
the sense that everything is collected, and that, in this respect, it reﬂects
the real world more faithfully than traditional data; it is also a global
phenomenon [11]; p. 2).
In the following, I discuss Big Data in combination with two other
concepts of importance to the issue at hand. Artiﬁcial intelligence is used
as a term to describe machines that are capable of performing tasks that
are thought to require intelligence [12]; p. 9). They can be very simple
tasks performed by industrial robots, or they can be tasks we consider to
be both more complicated and more important, such as determining
who gets a loan from a bank, who is given bail and who is not when
placed under arrest [13]. Machine learning, another term we often hear
in the same context, refers to systems that ‘improve their performance
on a given task over time through experience’, and not through being
trained or controlled by humans [12]; p. 9). When algorithms learn
from Big Data, we enter the world of which I write.
The technologies themselves are not necessarily the problem, Zuboﬀ
[3] argues. She maintains that the true problem is the underlying
system she refers to as surveillance capitalism. Large corporations that
control the new technologies operate by a logic where there are few, or
no, limits on the gathering and analysis of data for commercial pur-
poses. It is how we employ technology, then, that is the main problem. A
proper understanding of algorithms requires that we understand the
‘warm human and institutional choices’ behind them, instead of seeing
them as neutral technological phenomena [14]. It is also very important
to be aware of the business models that form the basis for commercial
applications of Big Data and algorithms. Foer [15] provides a good
account of how the proﬁt motive has changed the media landscape as
we know it. The never-ending demand for more attention and more
clicks is fed by deep insight from Big Data, which, in turn, is used to
tune algorithms in ways that provide people with the kind of content
that maximises the variables the provider of information desires to be
maximised. These variables are usually not our enlightenment, or the
health of our democratic societies, and he fears that a ‘world without
mind’will be the result [15]. Bucher [16] also describes how algorithms
have changed news and journalism, while Gillespie [17] shows how the
rhetorical and discursive tactics of companies are often employed to
give an air of neutrality. In the end, however, they are driven by the
pursuit of proﬁt. While Foer [15] focuses on the monopolistic ambitions
of the big tech companies, Zuboﬀ [3] argues that surveillance capit-
alism is something new that deﬁes old analytical tools such as monopoly
and privacy. Lanier [18] asks Who owns the future? In societies where
the underlying system is based on monetising data, and problematizes
the distributional eﬀects of present day society. According to Zuboﬀ
[3]; we are neither consumers nor employees of these large companies,
and Lanier [18] argues that a radical new approach to handling data is
required if we are to live in a society in which technology is used as we
use it today. These debates are of great importance to society, and it is
necessary to understand these phenomena if we are to understand the
true eﬀects of technology. I will at times refer to these broader issues,
but will focus on how the mechanisms described threaten liberty even
without phenomena such as Zuboﬀ's surveillance capitalism.
I deliberately choose a non-technical approach to the issues at hand,
and my goal is to present a simpliﬁed, but credible picture of these
technologies that covers (a) the basic workings of Big Data and AI, and
(b) a future in which these technologies have evolved slightly. I posit
that the issues I discuss will only become more pressing with time, and
that it is important to deal with the fundamental issues, rather than
with speciﬁc implementations of the technologies as they have existed
or exist right now. In this section, I establish three propositions that will
function as premises in my conclusion. They are related to (a) human
nature and our tendency to seek information that corroborates, rather
than challenges views we already hold, (b) algorithms and ﬁlter bub-
bles, and (c) the way in which we can now live digital lives in digital
spaces inhabited to a large degree by like-minded people.
2.2. Human nature, selective exposure and conﬁrmation bias
Man is a peculiar species, and people who study our behaviour tend
to describe us as biased in our search for information. We are not fully
rational, and there are many facets of our psychology that make us
vulnerable to bad decision-making. These eﬀects are discussed in detail
in the literature on nudging [19,20]; p. 91), and, for example, by
Kahneman [21]. How these biases can be exploited using Big Data and
AI is discussed in Sætra [22]. Here, I focus more speciﬁcally on selective
exposure and conﬁrmation bias.
Selective exposure concerns individuals' propensity to seek out in-
formation that ‘aligns with their views and beliefs and avoid such
content that is diﬀerent in perspective or even challenging to their
position’ [23]; p. 153). This theory is from the 1960s, but it has received
increasing attention as the algorithmic curation of information has
become widespread, and is now ‘one of the most commonly used the-
ories in communication scholarship’ [24]; p. 677 [25]; p. 342).
The reason for its resurgence should be clear: personalisation means
that selective exposure has never been more relevant [26]; p. 21). Ex-
plicit, or implicit, personalisation makes the task of avoiding un-
comfortable information, and obtaining information that supports our
views, beliefs and decisions, much easier than at any previous point in
history [27]; p. 3). Personalisation does not just make it possible to
choose what one is exposed to, it actually leads to increasing selective
exposure [28]. While there is disagreement about the strength of this
eﬀect, even people who tell us to relax say that the eﬀect is there [27];
p. 10).
A related phenomenon is cognitive dissonance, which is studied in the
work of Festinger [70]. The reason we avoid information that conﬂicts
with our beliefs is that it causes discomfort, and, as with other aversive
stimuli and uncomfortable phenomena, we seek to reduce exposure to it
[29]; p. 470 [24]; p. 676 [23]; p. 154). The work by Garrett [24,30]
suggests that the possibility of selecting what we are exposed to leads to
greater exposure to supporting information, but not necessarily less
exposure to information that conﬂicts with our existing beliefs.
As such, the theory of conﬁrmation bias is proposed to be a better
explanation of what actually happens in our new digital landscapes
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[24]; p. 679 [31]; p. 557). Conﬁrmation bias explains the tendency we
have to seek or interpret information in ways that support ‘existing
beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand’ [32]; p. 175). This bias is
not the result of conscious eﬀort, and people are not aware that they are
seeking and evaluating information in the way described here [32]; p.
175). Nickerson [32]; p. 175) describes how our unconscious selves at
times work in a way resembling a lawyer building a case – not in order
to shed equal light on all aspects of a case, but in order to win.
Iyengar & Hahn [26] show that, in experiments, people prefer news
sources they expect to agree with, both for political issues and ‘softer’
issues, such as travel. They point to a growing body of evidence, and
others such as Jonas et al. [31]; p. 557, 568) have carried out experi-
ments in which stronger selective exposure eﬀects are found in settings
that resemble real-life situations, with information being presented
sequentially [26]; p. 21). Festinger originally considered selective ex-
posure to be a problem related to conscious choice [24]; p. 679). With
the rise of algorithms, unconscious selective exposure seems to be of
even greater interest to us today.
2.2.1. Proposition 1
Individuals have a propensity to seek information that corresponds
to their pre-existing conceptions, through such mechanisms as selective
exposure and conﬁrmation bias.
2.3. Algorithms, curation of information and ‘ﬁlter bubbles’
Attention is a scarce good, and even before the advent of online
abundance of information, we all ﬁltered, constantly [5,21]. The main
ﬁltering tool is the algorithm, which is little more than computer code
that transforms input into output [33]. What makes algorithms inter-
esting is that they are not, and cannot be, considered neutral [34]; p. 35;
[33]. The input could be all the news articles available, and the output
could be what I see in my News Feed in Facebook. Bucher [35] provides
a good account of how Facebook's algorithms choose what we see based
on aﬃnity (to authors), weight (of diﬀerent kinds of material) and time
decay (giving us more new stories). Of particular interest is her argu-
ment that these algorithms create clear rules for how to act in order to
be successful (get a lot of attention), and quite severe sanctions for
those who violate these rules (invisibility) [35]. See Bucher [16] for a
more complete account of the relationship between algorithmic power
and politics, as well as a history of algorithms and an exposition on
their technical aspects.
While algorithms are automated and a machine technically chooses
what I get to see, the choice is based on some initial instruction, and it is
performed in pursuit of a set goal. If I run a social media site and want
to maximise my revenue, I will instruct my algorithm to provide you
with as much pleasure as possible, in order to maximise the amount of
time you spend on my site, which maximises the revenue I receive, both
in terms of advertising income and, most importantly, the data I collect
about you. Like a map, or any other model of the world, an algorithm
includes some things and leaves other things out, and what is left out is
based on the ‘explicit and implicit values of their designers’ [34]; p. 35).
Gillespie [17] describes how companies that employ algorithms have
become ‘the primary keepers of the cultural discussion’, and states that
this is deeply troubling, due to their as yet quite unregulated operation.
These digital ‘platforms’ are not merely neutral areas in which in-
formation is freely given and acquired, since their owners seek the
maximisation of proﬁt – they are not philanthropic well-doers [17].
What is interesting is that (a) people do not realise how these al-
gorithms work, and (b) this process might lead to what Pariser [36] has
called ﬁlter bubbles [23]; p. 153). An algorithm works as a ﬁlter, and
when this ﬁlter (a) only lets some information through, and (b) is used
for most of an individual's information needs, the result is that the in-
dividual in question will be living, metaphorically, in a bubble. His
perception of reality becomes skewed.
Customisation and the prevalence of social networks and other sites
that provide content through algorithms makes this a real problem. The
algorithms are driven by Big Data and the abundant information we all
leave behind about our preferences and personalities. This means that
sites such as Facebook can end up creating separate ﬁlter bubbles for
many of us.
Here, I focus on two factors that make algorithmic curation of in-
formation problematic. Firstly, an algorithm, combined with Big Data
and machine learning, may start out quite naïve, but as soon as we start
making choices – liking some things, disliking others, spending a lot of
time on speciﬁc kinds of content etc. – the better the algorithms become
at providing us with exactly what we desire. They thereby lead to a
narrowing of the world we perceive. What we prefer is allowed through
the ﬁlter, while things that upset us are ﬁltered out. Secondly, the
creators of algorithms program them in order to achieve certain goals.
The speciﬁcs of these goals are undetectable to us and unrelated to our
own preferences. This means that, even if a person did not exhibit se-
lective exposure, the world he sees through the algorithms by which he
lives will not be a neutral representation of the world.
The way algorithms shade the glasses through which we see the
world is of greater and greater importance as customisation and per-
sonalisation increase [27]; p. 2). Personalisation can be explicit, in the
sense that we actively help to train the algorithms by telling them to
hide particular content etc., or it can be implicit, as the algorithms
simply learn from our behaviour [27]; p. 2). The eﬀects of both kinds of
personalisation may be problematic, as the research of Rader and Gray
[33] shows. Social networks are at the forefront of the personal curation
of information, and about 68% of Americans already get news via social
media sites [37]. One in ﬁve get news there often, and Facebook is by
far the most popular network, as 43% of Americans get news via Fa-
cebook. Flaxman et al. [38]; p. 298) notes that the eﬀects of social
media are tempered by regular media. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. [27];
p. 2, 7, 10) have examined mainstream media outlets, and say that they
are, as yet, still in the infancy of personalisation. As such, they are not as
likely to create algorithm-based ﬁlter bubbles.
2.3.1. Proposition 2
Algorithms powered by Big Data play an increasingly large part in
curating the overwhelming amount of information that is available in
modern society. Such algorithms are not neutral, and will always
choose what information to present to users based on some pre-
determined logic.
2.4. Intergroup heterogeneity and intragroup homogeneity
The third factor I consider is that it is now possible for us to create
digital spaces in which like-minded people can congregate. Historically,
such contact has not been easy. When at work, with my family, or when
shopping in the small town I live in, the chances of ﬁnding someone
who shares my views on, and interest in, say, Thomas Hobbes, are not
great. The fact that I constantly have to deal with people who do not
agree with me could potentially be quite upsetting to me. I get little
support for my opinions, and I constantly have to deal with everyone
around me saying things that ﬁt poorly with how I see the world.
Previously, I might have attempted to relocate, say to a university with
plenty of political theorists, or I might ﬁnd a pen pal with whom I could
share my views and interests. Either way, historically, I would be living
most of my life interacting with real people with opinions very diﬀerent
from my own.
Today, however, I could simply create an online group for all the
happy Hobbesians out there. I could also befriend these people, and
after not too long I might have a social network that was predominantly
composed of Hobbesians. The occasional family member and childhood
friend might drop by of course, but they can easily be hidden from my
newsfeed, making them merely hypothetical friends that I never see. It is
important to note that, even if I do not explicitly hide these people,
algorithms will be hiding them for me, often without me even realising
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it, as a result, for example, of the algorithmic weight given to aﬃnity as
described by Bucher [35]. See Gillespie [14,17] for a more thorough
discussion of how non-neutral algorithms based on non-neutral datasets
leave some things out, while highlighting others.
In this new digital space, I would see news stories shared by my
fellows, their comments on these stories and other events, and their
opinions on all sort of other things. This would be my new world. I
might occasionally have to leave my house and brieﬂy interact with real
people, but I needn't place much emphasis on this, as my real life is now
in my new digital world. Whenever I criticise a scholar for treating
Hobbes as a straw man, I hear nothing but cheers, and when others post
their Hobbesian analyses of current world aﬀairs, the whole group
applauds. We have created an echo chamber [5]. And while my Hob-
besian echo chamber might be considered quite benign, other echo
chambers are far darker, and can consist of people who, for example,
share a hatred of everyone who is diﬀerent – in their opinions, politics,
skin colour, religion or anything else.
An echo chamber is a space in which ‘individuals are largely ex-
posed to conforming opinions’ [38]; p. 299). As such, we ‘inhabit dif-
ferent worlds’ when we inhabit diﬀerent echo chambers [23]; p. 152).
In these worlds, we tend to share more of the information we believe to
be conformable to group opinion, and so will the others [38]; p. 299).
The eﬀect is increased polarisation, as described by, for example,
Sunstein [5]. Allcott & Gentzkow [39] conducted a study showing that
20% of liberals' friends have the opposite ideological view, while the
proportion for conservatives was 18%. One important aspect of digital
media is that it is becoming easy to cater to much smaller groups (even
individuals) than was possible with mass media. While mass media
could cater to diﬀerent positions in binary situations (blue/red, pro/con
Brexit, etc.), the process described here divides these large groups into
ever smaller groups, with great intragroup homogeneity. In large
groups with little intragroup homogeneity, the eﬀects described here
will not be as severe, as there is a broad range of choices and opinions
contained within them.
In echo chambers, people are comfortable, and while their own
opinions are reinforced, they ‘lose the inclination to proactively discuss
ideas with people or groups of a diﬀerent position’ [23]; p. 151). When
we consider the fact that groups tend to take more extreme positions
than individuals, this spells danger [40]; p. 125 [23]; p. 151). We are
less exposed to ‘cross-cutting content’ on social media, and our friends
are the most important factor: people choose like-minded friends who
share news and opinions based on similar positions [41].
Consequently, we now belong to groups with a high degree of in-
tergroup heterogeneity and a higher degree of intragroup homogeneity.
When considered together with the two preceding phenomena, the
compound eﬀects we can envisage warrant a warning. Gerken [42] calls
this phenomenon second-order diversity, and Sunstein [5] discusses how
such a society can beneﬁt from enclave discussions. The issue of in-
dividual identity vs. Group identity falls outside the scope of this article,
but I refer readers to Postmes, Spears, & Lea [43] and Postmes, T.,
Spears, R., Lee, A. T., & Novak, R. J [44]. for a discussion of these
issues.
2.4.1. Proposition 3
In the digital world, it is easy to create areas in which people can
associate with like-minded people. In contrast to our lives in physical
space, where (a) fewer like-minded people are accessible, and (b) there
are greater chances of encountering people with various beliefs, such
areas can become what are referred to as echo chambers.
3. Freedom
3.1. Positive liberty, negative liberty, and a third, diﬀerent kind of liberty:
non–domination
Liberty is a many-faceted term, and among the most famous of these
facets are Berlin's [45] concepts of positive and negative liberty. Positive
liberty is what Carter [46] prefers to label self-mastery – by which he
refers to ‘the dominance of an “authentic” self over a merely empirical
self’ [46]; p. 6). Berlin mentions being a subject, rather than an object, as
central to positive liberty, and he also mentions such things as being
one's own master and being in control of one's own life in the sense of
being self-directed and autonomous [45]; p. 178).
Negative liberty, on the other hand, consists in the absence of in-
terference [45]; p. 169). Absence of interference from other men is what
is considered, and not the absence of interference from nature, or being
obstructed by internal obstacles, such as desires, irrationality, weakness
of will etc.
MacCallum [47] and Skinner [48] are among those who criticise the
idea of two separate forms of liberty. Carter [46]; p. 6) also seeks what
he calls overall freedom – a freedom compatible with both negative
liberty and the idea that freedom might be ability. The ﬁnal concept I
shall mention is that of liberty as non-domination, where domination
consists in (a) the capacity to interfere, (b) arbitrarily, (c) in choices a
person could otherwise make [49]; p. 52). Pettit [49] advances this
idea, and places it between negative and positive liberty. It is negative in
that it requires the absence of domination by others, and positive in the
sense that it requires more than this absence; it also demands security for
this absence [49]; p. 51). If I am not interfered with right now, but
something could interfere with me at any time, I am not fully free.
Freedom requires my freedom to be protected as well, according to Pettit
[49].
3.2. Liberty and tyranny as political and social phenomena
There is no tyranny more dangerous than an invisible and benign
tyranny, one in which subjects are complicit in their victimization, and
in which enslavement is a product of circumstance rather than intention
[50]; p. 582).
In order to evaluate the threats posed by the phenomena described
in this article, I turn to Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill – two classical
liberals who were concerned with liberty.
Tocqueville is perhaps most famous for his warnings against the
eﬀects of the tyranny of the majority. What struck him when visiting
America was that freedom of discussion – and even freedom of thought
itself – was limited, which led to a lack of ‘independence of mind’ [51];
p. 293). This lack of independence of mind might be seen as a lack of
liberty, particularly positive liberty. At the very least, it is a cause for
concern about the meaning of both liberty, in general. and such terms as,
for example, freedom of speech [5]. Mill and Tocqueville both opine
that people need access to a wide or full set of facts and opinions in
order for these forms of freedom to be truly meaningful.
Tocqueville's concept of a tyranny of the majority is often thought to
refer to the possibility that a small majority could subjugate and
dominate the rest of the population. This is not the kind of tyranny I am
concerned with, and I will instead speak of a tyranny of opinion when I
discuss what I ﬁnd to be most interesting in Tocqueville's concept.
When Tocqueville speaks of tyranny in America, he discusses tyr-
anny as a social and cultural phenomenon [52]; p. 301; [53]. Mill [54];
p. 178) reviewed Tocqueville's book, and he noted that Tocqueville's
tyranny ‘is of another kind – a tyranny not over the body, but over the
mind’. Liberty does not just consist in political liberty and safety from a
majority that creates poor laws or arbitrarily abuses physical power. It
also consists in a liberty of spirit and opinion, and this liberty is threa-
tened, or preserved, by society – not primarily through politics and the
government. This form of liberty is particularly interesting with regard
to the technologies I examine. Tocqueville describes America's ‘own
unique brand of tyranny’, where the tyrant is ‘the entire society itself,
acting in concert without the need of oppressive laws’ [52]; p. 301). The
lack of independence of mind is seen as the result of the ‘moral power’
of the majority [52]; p. 301 [51]; p. 293).
This moral power is not used to direct the actions of individuals
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through force, but to mould ‘their very natures’ [52]; p. 301). I argue
that a tyranny ‘over hearts and minds’ that manages to strip individuals
of individuality cannot be considered less of a threat to liberty than a
tyranny based on physical oppression and interference in the more
obvious sense [52]; p. 302). Today we have a tyranny that has come to
power right before our eyes – partly by superﬁcial consent. Some might
claim that the tyranny of opinion is something diﬀerent from the facets
of society Zuboﬀ [3] describes as surveillance capitalism. However, it
makes sense to view, as Zuboﬀ does, the rise to power of the surveil-
lance capitalists as one of the main reasons for the developments
leading to the increasingly social nature of all aspects of life, and the
race towards a world where nothing is truly private. We could also
invoke the concept of societies of control, in which individuals have
become dividiuals – divisible entities that can be recast in various forms
[55]. These aspects of power and individuality are of great interest, but
they fall outside the scope of the current article.
However, even if such a tyranny is voluntary, it must be guarded
against if liberty is to be preserved, particularly since such a tyranny is
hard to perceive and may arise gradually without people noticing.
Furthermore, as Zuboﬀ [3] notes, the initial phases of such a tyranny
are marked by stealth and lawless conditions, and even today it is ar-
guable that few people really give what would be considered informed
consent when they agree to the terms required for access to what has
become almost vital social infrastructure.
For Tocqueville, the very notion of coercion had to be redeﬁned, as
people did not recognise it in its classical form – the coercing tyrant was
apparently nowhere to be found. Horwitz [52]; p. 304) even uses the
term psychic coercion to describe the way the majority forces everyone
into something resembling uniformity. Coercion is usually thought to
involve the use of physical compulsion, but, in lack of a better way to
describe the psychological dimension of domination, I argue in favour
of broadening the concept of coercion to also include such phenomena.
This is in accordance with the approach taken by Sætra [22]; where the
coercive potentialities of the combination of nudging and Big Data is
discussed. In America, everyone was the source of this tyranny – ‘each
member of the community was both oppressor and oppressed’ – and the
instincts that make us rebel against injustice and oppression do not
seem to be triggered by such a tyranny [52]; p. 303). In Horwitz's
words:
Coercion was not abhorrent because it was not really coercion;
conformity was hardly onerous because it was freely chosen.
Despotism, Tocqueville argued, had arrived at a new stage of perfec-
tion, since those who were oppressed gloriﬁed their oppression and
honored their oppressor [52]; p. 303).
Tocqueville himself says that he sought ‘in vain for an expression
that exactly reproduces my idea of it and captures it fully … [t]he old
words “despotism” and “tyranny” will not do … the thing is new’ [51]; p.
818). Maletz [53]; p. 756) points to the penalty for opposing the tyr-
anny in question, which consists of being ‘disregarded, ignored, over-
looked’ – in short, of being ostracised [53]; p. 756). ‘Chains and ex-
ecutions’ are a thing of the past, Tocqueville says, as modern society
‘has today brought improvement to everything, even to despotism’
[51]; p. 294). The modern tyrant does not punish unpopular utterings
with death. Instead, he sentences dissenters to live as aliens in their own
country, to the scorn of fellow citizens, and to being shunned ‘as one
who is impure’ [51]; p. 294) ‘Go in peace,’ the tyrant says, ‘I will not
take your life, but the life I leave you with is worse than death’ [51]; p.
294). In the modern world, some argue that this would be invisibility
[35].
Freedom requires more than me being allowed to swing my arms
and legs around without restriction – it demands that I am also able to,
so to speak, swing my tongue, and my mind. For me to be free, I must be
able to say and think things that are contrary to popular opinion,
without risking ostracism and heavy social sanctions. A tyranny that
‘ignores the body and goes straight for the soul’ cannot be considered
any less of a threat to liberty than its opposite [51]; p. 294). It would
surely violate Pettit's conditions for non-domination [49].
3.2.1. Proposition 4
Liberty requires, in addition to freedom from physical interference,
an absence of social and psychological interference – domination – that
blocks the freedom of spirit and opinion.
3.3. Information and individuality
One of the main concerns of Mill in On Liberty [56] was to convey
the importance of being exposed to novel opinions, regardless of whe-
ther or not they contain truth, non-truth or partial truth. He describes
the ‘the quiet suppression of half’ of the truth as the ‘the formidable
evil’, and writes that ‘there is always hope when people are forced to
listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden
into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the eﬀect of truth by
being exaggerated into falsehood’ [56]; p. 115).
For Mill, the idea of individuality is crucial, and individuality is
important with regard to the developments I deal with here. Mill does,
however, state that he regards ‘utility as the ultimate appeal on all
ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on
the permanent interests of man as a progressive being’ [56]; p. 70). I
argue that utility also requires that we foster individuality, because in
‘proportion to the development of his individuality, each person be-
comes more valuable to himself, and is, therefore, capable of being
more valuable to others’ [56]; p. 127).
One reason why individuality is important is that it prevents sub-
jectivity and communal values from developing ‘in lockstep’ [57]; p.
1911). Individuality is important to Mill, and Hamburger [58]; when
discussing Mill's ideas about control, states that ‘for Mill, interference,
denial of choice, coercion, and encroachments on individuality are
abhorrent’ (2001, p. 4). Individuality is both a precondition for and a
guarantor of liberty in Mill's work.
Individuality requires that one has access to a variety of information
– for inspiration, or simply to realise that something else is possible [5].
Similarly, for it to be meaningful, liberty requires that there are options.
If a society removes all options but one, but insists that people are free
to choose whatever they desire, liberty has little meaning. A functioning
liberal democracy also requires that citizens have access to a variety of
information [50]; p. 582). In order to make reasonable choices,
awareness of a broad set of ‘opinions and options’ is required [4]. These
concepts are related, in that one could argue that, if liberty is to be
preserved, one has to provide the individual with the opportunity to (a)
be informed about the world in which he lives, and (b) to be free to
choose the way in which he wants to live. Considering man's tendency
to selective exposure, and how companies program their algorithms to
maximise proﬁt, we might even argue that, in addition to access to a
broad array of information, one should also seek to attain a certain level
of minimum exposure to this information. Sunstein [5] enters a plea for
serendipity and examines how we can counter the eﬀects I discuss. See
also Bozdag & van den Hoven [4] for a discussion of some ways to
technically combat ﬁltering eﬀects.
3.3.1. Proposition 5
Access and exposure to a broad array of information is a require-
ment for the development of individuality.
4. The threat of a tyranny of perceived opinion
4.1. Turning the propositions into premises
I have thus far put forth ﬁve propositions that will now be con-
sidered as premises for my concluding argument. A summary of the
premises is presented here, but please refer to their full statement for a
more precise rendition of the complete argument.
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• P1: Individuals have a propensity to seek information that supports
their pre-existing conceptions (and to avoid information that con-
ﬂicts with the same).
• P2: Algorithms, which are not neutral, function as curators of in-
formation in modern society.
• P3: Digital technology and social networks allow people with similar
opinions to congregate, and tend to make them do so, minimising
the need to deal with people with conﬂicting opinions.
• P4: Liberty requires, in addition to freedom from physical inter-
ference, an absence of social and psychological interference that
blocks freedom of spirit and opinion.
• P5: Access and exposure to a broad array of information is a re-
quirement for the development of individuality.
My ﬁrst conclusion is that premises 1, 2 and 3, when combined,
create great potential for living lives in which one is predominantly
exposed to information that supports pre-existing opinions and mini-
mises contact with opposing views. Algorithms are not neutral and may
distort and restrict the information we receive, and tend to do so, both
unintentionally and for the purpose of achieving some goal of their
creator. When our views are further driven to narrowness by the human
tendency to prefer information that conﬁrms our preconceptions, our
window to the world becomes a slit. When, in addition to this, in-
dividuals also congregate with like-minded people and get social sup-
port for their opinions, the potential for citizens to live with radically
diﬀerent perceptions of reality becomes quite great. The diﬀerence,
then, is apparently intergroup, while there is great intragroup homo-
geneity. I will refer to this as the compound conﬁrmation eﬀect of in-
formation technology and social networks.
The second conclusion I wish to draw is that the eﬀects of premises
1, 2 and 3, combined with premise 5, point to a threat to individuality.
If the compound conﬁrmation eﬀect just described makes it diﬃcult to
have access to varied information, individuality is threatened. And, if
individuality is lost, liberty makes little sense. The main conclusion is
that, when all the premises are considered, they paint a picture of a
substantial threat to liberty.
4.2. The tyranny of perceived opinion
If the premises established above are accepted, the threat to liberty
emerges as a two-headed creature. The two heads are somewhat si-
milar, but the creature in question is a hybrid, with one human head,
and one that is the head of a machine.
The human side of the threat is nothing short of a resurrection, with
a vengeance, of the phenomenon described by Tocqueville. His tyranny
is most prevalent when the moral power of popular opinion is (actually,
or is perceived to be) strong, and it seems evident that this power be-
comes greater as groups become more and more homogenous. The
cumulative force of uniformity is heightened as more and more people
get in line.
It may seem paradoxical to claim that modern society is homo-
genous, and this is where I argue that we have a new form of
Tocquevillian tyranny that follows from the increased within-group
homogeneity that follows from the tendency of like-minded people to
gather in what have been referred to as echo chambers.
What happens on Facebook when one of your friends posts a rant
that greatly displeases you? You immediately feel your heart rate in-
creasing and your hands becoming moist. An opinion radically diﬀerent
from yours has triggered something in you, and you have three options.
You can (a) ignore it, (b) argue with the person, or (c) hide the person. If
you become suﬃciently annoyed, alternative (a) is hard, and you know
that this person will most likely post something similar again quite
soon. Alternative (b) is an often advocated option, but it is a costly
option. You will have to engage with someone very diﬀerent from
yourself, and you will be at risk of losing a very public debate in front of
all of your, and his, friends. Option c) thus becomes an attractive
option. If I simply tell Facebook that I do not want to see this anymore, I
want to hide this person from my sight, the problem disappears. I must
note that I do not consider the more active ways in which a tyranny of
opinion can be ampliﬁed in the digital sphere. Blackford [59] provides
a good discussion of issues such as online moral police, online shaming
and what he calls cybermobs. While Tocqueville's tyrant can employ
such tactics, he may not need to when the perception of prevailing
opinion and expectations are strong.
But how does knowing all this aﬀect how I act? If followed by many,
is the option of hiding other people from sight very diﬀerent from the
punishment Tocqueville's tyrant meted out? The dissenter was shunned
and ignored – put out of sight, and not even digniﬁed with a response.
The possibility of such punishment makes most of us wary of what we
say and proclaim [35]. In addition, as human beings we have a strong
desire to be, or at least appear to be, consistent [32]; p. 197). Every time
I choose not to state something I believe to be controversial, or every
time I half-heartedly ‘like’ something just because I realise that it is
expected of me, I may commit myself to the mainstream position. If so,
the problem of selective exposure will be increasingly severe, and I will,
unconsciously, have locked myself into the cage of the opinions of my
group [40]; p. 128). Bucher's discussion of how sites such as Facebook
can create a fear of invisibility is highly relevant in this respect, and so is
the fact that, while we may not actively tell Facebook to ostracise those
we do not like, the mere fact of indicating little aﬃnity will lead the
algorithms to do it for us [35]. The details of how users change their
behaviour in order to convince the algorithms to make them visible are
described by Bucher [16] and Turkle [60].
4.3. When predictions and expectancies threaten liberty
I now turn to the mechanical head of my two-headed creature. The
problem, in short, is that algorithms and Big Data can be seen as partly
determining our development, while also removing the opportunity to
see alternatives to, and resist, the path with which we are presented
[61]; p. 579). Baruh & Popescu [61] are concerned with the power
imbalances created between individuals and institutions, and they fear
that the dynamics involved in employing Big Data may form individuals
by creating self-fulﬁlling prophecies [61]; p. 584). When Big Data leads
companies to predict preferences and actions, these very predictions
may lead people to live up to them [61]; p. 584). For example, a search
provider knows much more about us than the query we enter at a
certain point in time, and uses these data to predict and anticipate our
desires [14]. Using knowledge about us to improve a speciﬁc service is
behavioural feedback, but the data are used for much more, creating
what Zuboﬀ refers to as behavioural surplus [3]. This leads to problems
deciding whether an algorithm is successful because it provides the
correct output, or because the users adapt to the output, as discussed by
Lanier [18]. It is important to keep in mind that algorithms can be used
to intentionally inﬂuence actors as well, but I do not focus on this par-
ticular danger here.
This is particularly important as we are not suﬃciently prepared to
assess ethical issues involving machines. Zwitter [11] states that ‘the
very nature of Big Data has an underestimated impact on the in-
dividual's ability to understand its potential and make informed deci-
sions’. Of particular interest is his point about ethical issues being ob-
scured by the current state of aﬀairs in which ‘actions by many unaware
that they may have taken actions with unintended consequences for
anyone’ is the norm when new technologies are deployed [11]; p. 1).
Dwork & Mulligan [34]; p. 38) use the language of freedom, as they
state that the process of Big Data and the subsequent classiﬁcation
shackle users to proﬁles that are then used to determine what is relevant
for them, a process that relates to Deleuze's [55] concept of the divi-
dual. The algorithms are ‘prediction engines, constantly creating and
reﬁning a theory of who you are and what you'll do and want next’
[36]; p. 10). That such proﬁles are not accurate representations of a
person seems obvious, since some information is gathered, some is
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approximated, and a lot is considered unimportant for the purposes of
the proﬁle manager [14]. My argument is that such predictions, and the
expectations they create, are coupled with the tyranny just discussed,
and I focus on three ways in which we might go from the seemingly
useful to something more ominous.
Three theories from psychology and sociology can form the basis of
an objection to Big Data as we apply it, based on the eﬀects it has on the
free development of individuals. The theories are (a) the expectancy
eﬀect, (b) the Proteus eﬀect, and (c) the Thomas theorem. Other ways
of explaining how people adapt to algorithmic output are used by
others, and I focus on these eﬀects as being particularly eﬀective in
showing how an expectation can shape reality.
4.3.1. The expectancy eﬀect
The expectancy eﬀect, or behavioural conﬁrmation theory, de-
scribes a phenomenon whereby my expectations of someone actually
inﬂuences how he or she acts and performs [62–64]. It comes into play
as soon as individuals experience individualised proﬁles on websites,
entertainment services etc. Data are used to create an environment that
the service provider expects us to be comfortable with, and this involves
everything from the subtle organisation of content, the visual pre-
sentation of the content, and the various forms of suggestions oﬀered.
The entire service is experienced as custom-made for each individual,
which makes their expectations more likely to have the eﬀects de-
scribed as expectancy eﬀects or behavioural conﬁrmation. People may
perceive the suggestions and selections they are oﬀered on sites such as
Facebook and Netﬂix as being based on relatively objective criteria,
such as their usage history, but that is only partly the case. They are
based on history, what people similar to the user in question tend to do,
and on what the provider wants the user to consume [14]. Once again,
we must keep the non-neutrality of algorithms in mind.
This constitutes what is perceived as an expectancy, which can in
fact be self-fulﬁlling. We usually evaluate the accuracy of our predic-
tions by seeing how well actual behaviour conforms to our predictions
[61]; p. 584; [18]. If the predictions themselves cause behaviour to
change, this is obviously not a very useful measure of accuracy.
4.3.2. The Proteus eﬀect
The Proteus eﬀect describes how people might change their beha-
viour as a consequence of how they perceive themselves. Changing
their appearance in a digital setting also changes their behaviour (re-
gardless of how, or whether, others see them) [65]. The Proteus eﬀect,
which is based on the self-perception theory of [66]; suggests that
‘people often infer their own attitudes and beliefs by observing their
behaviors in the same manner they would observe another person’ [67].
This eﬀect describes behavioural change resulting from changes in
how a person is portrayed in a virtual environment, for example as an
avatar – a digital representation of the self – in a computer game, or an
online casino [61]; p. 584). When the avatar changes, the behaviour of
the user changes too. For example, when I am portrayed as attractive, I
tend to move closer to others and disclose more personal information,
and when made tall I tend to be more conﬁdent in negotiations [65].
Furthermore, when women are portrayed in a sexualised manner, they
become more prone to self-objectiﬁcation, and even report higher ac-
ceptance of rape myths [67]. How then, is this related to Big Data? In
social media, people are portrayed in various ways, and they are also
made aware of what is shown to, and liked by, other people. The fra-
mework for this representation of self is controlled by companies such
as Facebook, and what they choose to highlight to my friends from my
posts is also controlled by Facebook. Bucher's [35] fear of invisibility
may be the result of a conscious eﬀort to promote a certain behaviour,
and in portraying the user in diﬀerent ways, they may eﬀect real
changes in user behaviour. I venture the proposition that changes in
online representations of the self – arguably one of the most important
ways to portray oneself for many people in our age – can also change
behaviour and feelings of self.
4.3.3. The Thomas theorem
The ﬁnal theory to keep in mind is the Thomas theorem, which in
short-form details self-fulﬁlling prophecies [68]. The theory states that,
if people deﬁne situations as real, the consequences of those situations
are real. If I portray a situation – a prediction, or prophecy – and get you
to believe in it, there is a greater chance of my prediction actually
coming true than there would otherwise have been. Merton [68] gives
examples such as banking crises happening because of rumours about
banks having problems or a student failing a test because he worries and
believes he will fail. When algorithms present us with clear ex-
pectancies, we may perceive these expectations as prophecies that we,
in turn, make reality. Furthermore, since Big Data is based on inductive
and historical data, predictions will have a conservative force that
promulgates old deﬁnitions of how things are, despite the possibility
that things could very well have been diﬀerent. This is related to the
discussion of fairness in algorithms, and I refer to Binns [69] for a
discussion of fairness in machine learning based on political philo-
sophy.
Merton points to the ethnic conﬂicts between Afro-Americans and
whites, where the whites fail to see that ‘he and his kind have produced
the “facts” which he observes’ – the facts that prolong the conﬂict [68];
p. 196). The Thomas theorem shows how algorithmic prediction could
lead to external impediments to individuals' liberty, but, in combination
with the two other theories, it seems clear that such prediction can have
internal and external eﬀects simultaneously. Assuming that these eﬀects
are real, it seems uncontroversial to assume that the level of persona-
lisation of expectations and representations made possible by Big Data
and algorithms makes these eﬀects stronger.
5. Conclusion
Alexis De Tocqueville feared an immaterial tyranny of public opi-
nion – a tyrant who was hard to perceive, and whose tyranny was a
seemingly benign and voluntary reign. He showed that such a tyranny
was no less of a danger to liberty than the tyranny of old. I argue that a
tyranny of minds, not bodies, that people consent to because they do
not perceive what is happening, is an even greater danger than a tyr-
anny that we would all immediately recognise as such. In this article, I
show that we would be wise to heed the warnings of Tocqueville in our
own day and age, even if the tyranny he described now appears in a
slightly diﬀerent form.
The threat of tyranny, which is a threat to liberty, has arisen because
(a) we tend to seek facts that correspond to our pre-existing opinions,
(b) we use algorithms as curators of information, and (c) it is now easy
for us to create networks in which we mainly, or exclusively, associate
with people like us. The compound exposure eﬀect created by these
three factors is what makes Tocqueville's warning prescient. In our echo
chambers and ﬁlter bubbles, the tyranny of perceived opinion is a clear
and present danger to liberty.
While negative liberty is perhaps not most threatened, positive
liberty requires a form of autonomy that can easily require that we have
access to the information we need to be autonomous citizens. Pettit's
[49] concept of non-domination is very much applicable to our algo-
rithms, as they, and their creators, clearly have the capacity to interfere
arbitrarily in the choices we make when we seek to understand the
world and make the choices we do in our lives [4]. In this article, I have
deliberately chosen not to give a central place to discussions of the
possibility of abusing algorithms, as I believe the threat to liberty is
clear enough even without this form of manipulation and coercion. It is
very easy, however, to include this aspect of Big Data and algorithms in
order to make the argument far stronger, and I refer again to Sætra [22]
for an account of the coercive aspects of Big Data.
In addition to the threat to liberty, we should also take note of the
fact that a liberal and healthy society seems to require well-informed
citizens with a similar enough worldview to enable them to discuss,
debate and deliberate together in order to ﬁnd a direction ahead for
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society. This is a concern even if we are not inclined to view deliberative
democracy as the main concern [5]. The decreased breadth of the in-
formation we receive due to the situation I have described here has
clear implications for the development of each individual's in-
dividuality and liberty, and I have restricted myself to this level. The
threat to society posed by these developments is of great importance,
and it is paramount that they are given more attention in the disciplines
of political science and law, so that they do not remain in the exclusive
domain of communication studies and information technology. These
are important disciplines, but the issues in question require a thorough
debate in other disciplines as well about the proper role of technology
and the legislation of it. I agree with Coeckelbergh's [2] view that po-
litical philosophy should be included in this debate.
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